# Nazi Germany, Science and the Holocaust

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For a long time the assassination of the European Jews was regarded as synonymous with irrationality and Zivilisationsbruch, a rupture with civilisation; organised systematically like a factory all right, but still the expression of blind racial delusion. As one survivor stated in the Eichmann trial, Auschwitz was "another planet', a universe where conventional rules and habits of human civilization did not apply." <sup>1)</sup> Lawrence Langer <sup>2)</sup> demonstrated that it is exactly this rupture between the normal world and the universe of extermination, which caused the nightmares many of the survivors, suffered from since their liberation and still do so till the end of their lives. Many of them changed so much through the persecution that they didn't recognize themselves again. Not just physically: the permanent death threat and the determination to survive frequently forced them into modes of behaviour, which contradicted the standards of both their own and the environmental values – be it "just" the numbing towards the sufferings of others vital for self-preservation, even if "others" meant good friends or family. For years to come it was exactly this inconsistency, which afflicted the survivors, made their experiences not conveyable and explained their ruptured relationship with the world. For all the systematics in organising and all the rationality in executing the Holocaust – the determinative experience for the victims consisted in arbitrariness and unpredictability. The utter lack of any kind of utilitarian rationality was and still is regarded as the characteristic that distinguished the Holocaust from other genocides. As Hannah Arendt already noted, it was not the Holocaust's amount of victims, but the complete lack of consideration for utility and interest on part of the murderers that was unique.

Recent genocide research starts from the point that the Holocaust is comparable to other mass assassination but nevertheless unique, namely for the subsequent reasons: Divergent from other victims of mass crimes, Jews were labelled as *Untermenschen*, sub-humans, who had to be entirely exterminated, in order to save the Aryan race from degeneration and descend. <sup>3</sup> Furthermore the assassination of the European Jews had come from "one of the most scientifically and industrially advanced countries of Europe". <sup>4</sup>

And finally it was its modern bureaucratic organisation that distinguished the Holocaust from other mass assassinations in history: The registration and denotation of the victims, the skilful propaganda handling, the centralisation of Jews in ghettos and camps, the use of "highly specialized mobile killing squads", of death camps and gas chambers, the mobilisation of all occupational groups of German society as well as the incorporation of other states in the policy of the extermination of the Jews. Focal point of my subsequent expositions is the reflection, that the Holocaust was a modern "crime" not just in regard to its execution techniques but also in regard to the long-term targets pursued by the perpetrators and their concepts of social redesign. Thus it is not just a question of naming perpetrators and duplicating the dynamics of the crimes, but to analyse the structures of the perpetrators' society (*Tätergesellschaft*)". <sup>5</sup> In the following I'd like to consider both subjects – the social transformational process in the context of the Holocaust as well as the constitution of the "perpetrators' society" – in detail, so as to contribute to the discussion about similarities and differences between the three mass exterminations that are the subject of this symposium.

At this I am going to focus on the following aspects: 1) model concepts for a New Europe under German rule, 2) the scientific foundation of these ideas and 3) the material basis for the concurrence of all sectors of German society in the persecution and assassination of the Jews.

## Overpopulation, Resettlement and Selection

To this date historians are debating which was the month in 1941, when the decision for the assassination of the European Jews was made - or else that maybe the one decision did not exist after all, but just a long process of trial and error, radicalising increasingly of its own accord. There is no doubt, however, that the course for it was set by the expansion war in the East. "The imperial drive to the East, accompanied by mass murder on a colossal scale, was as much a race war as a military campaign, and its genocidal logic was inherent in the ideology that underpinned the attack on the Soviet Union in the first place. By the time the United States entered the war and the latter became a World War, the extermination of all the Jews of Europe had become a central goal. Hence the war also became a war against the Jews, one that had been forecast as such by Hitler already in January 1939."<sup>6</sup> The invasion first of Poland and later of the Soviet Union increased the number of Jews on German dominated territory by far. Now this was no longer a question of approx. 500,000 German Jews, many of them identifying themselves rather as Germans than as Jews, but of millions of so-called "Ostjuden", Eastern Jews. Already during WWI German soldiers regarded them as the quintessence of poverty, underdevelopment and primitiveness. In WWII, only a few weeks after the military occupation, the Germans began to experiment in Poland with what they called the "New Order." They wanted to impose new economic and social structures not only on the newly occupied neighbouring state, but also on the entire Eastern half of Europe, in order to turn the supposedly "backward" agricultural states in this part of the continent into a productive part of the "Greater Europe"the alleged "Living space" of the German people.

In the eyes not only of German economic planners but also of their colleagues in various Western European countries and in the United States, Poland, as well as most countries in Eastern Europe, was underdeveloped, its economy both badly organised and starved of capital. Above all, however, too many people derived their livelihoods from the land. A third of the population--in certain districts even more--would be deemed surplus, should modern means of cultivation be adopted. Thus in the agricultural sector, which made up most of the economy, capital was neither accumulated to any significant degree, nor did farmers possess the neces-

sary purchasing power to pay for industrial products. The economists calculated that in South eastern Europe, whose overpopulation would also have to be regulated, there were between twelve and fifteen million workers on the land who would have to be "set in motion;" if their families were included, about fifty million people would have to be pushed out of their domestic subsistence lifestyle if the German industrial economy was to benefit. The "unexploited labour power" of these people could be used to build up the infrastructure, building roads, straightening rivers, or draining marshes. Or they could be transported to Germany for forced labour.

Without a forcible intervention from outside, poverty and overpopulation would deteriorate and labour productivity sink continuously. Aside from these economic considerations, in the opinion of German experts on Eastern Europe, the "growing impoverishment of the population" threatened the country's political stability. German experts on Eastern Europe shared this view with their colleagues in the West. However, German scientists developed a specific "therapy," as they called it, against overpopulation. They regarded the "de-Judaization" as a first step towards the stabilization of the economic and social structure in Poland. The minister for economic affairs of occupied Poland sketched his concept of a future economic policy like this: "The prerequisite for thriving economic activity" was "a fundamental change in the whole structure of the economy", involving first of all "a significant rationalization of the Jewish sector". "By compressing the Jewish sector opportunities would be created for the Polish sector to catch up (...) Naturally this commercial migration had to be properly organized, so that it didn't take place in an anarchic, undisciplined way." In the locally confined Jewish business community, made up of small and very small businesses, he saw an obstacle to the economy. The "commercial migration" envisaged by him, on the other hand, was intended to open up the markets of the East. The new, artificially created Polish "medium-sized businesses" would be easier to monitor and control. Prerequisite for these plans were large-scale resettlements, the "transplantation of entire ethnic contingents" as Himmler put it. Thinking in ethnic terms, as I will point out later, was inseparably linked to a categorization of the population into groups of different, hierarchically graduated "value". The lowest level in this hierarchy had the Jews.

Five weeks after the outbreak of war, on 6 October 1939, Hitler proclaimed his intention to 'create a new ethnographic order' in Europe. This he proposed to achieve through "a resettlement of nationalities". The outcome of this process was to be "the emergence of clearer dividing lines". At the same time Hitler announced that "efforts (would be made) to clarify and settle the Jewish problem". The very next day Hitler made Himmler responsible for organizing the logistical side of this violent expulsion of whole nations. Himmler promptly styled himself "Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood", and set up an office of same name. Within a few months Himmler's small office had grown into a powerful, wideranging institution that set the tone of policy, underpinned by a whole network of banks, limited companies, planning groups, an "industry start-up and advisory agency" and regional planning staffs. All these bodies were armed with the authority to issue instructions to existing institutions. They employed SS men, social workers and community liaison staff, architects, auditors, administrators, agronomists, bookkeepers.... All these different skills and activities were harnessed to one single purpose: to organize resettlement policy in the annexed regions of western Poland. People were dispossessed and driven from their homes, others were drafted in to replace them. The Reich Commissioner reorganized entire villages and towns and set itself the task of "completely changing the face of the countryside".

The German resettlement experts combined racial, population and structural policy in a comprehensive and unified concept for – as they called it - 'German reconstruction in the East". The simplest and cheapest "solution" was a population policy that was as deliberate as it was brutal. Founded on the racist norms of National socialist society, it developed these into a practical instrument of social engineering. The resettlement of whole population groups created freedom of movement for the realization of vast projects, allowed the necessary funding to be "released" and cleared the way for the attempted construction, by force and at the expense of other people, of a society that was to be a model of efficiency in its social and economic organization and infrastructure. So the work of the Reich Commissioner was centred on population policy, both positive and negative: its victims were discriminated against and "eliminated", its beneficiaries were privileged and promoted. The western regions of Poland were to be "Germanised" as quickly as possible and their economic systems adapted to the needs of the German Reich. Germans, who for previous decades had been living as minorities in various Eastern European countries, were now to be settled in the conquered Polish territories.

To that end the planners at the Reich Commissioner proposed to expel the Jewish population and a portion of the native Polish population from these territories and to deport them further to the east. The houses, farms, shops and workshops of the deportees were either closed down, demolished or allocated to ethnic Germans "repatriated" from the Baltic states, from Sovietoccupied eastern Poland and later from Romania.

The expulsion of Polish and Jewish people formed a unity with the settlement of the ethnic Germans and rested institutionally in the hands of the very same person: Heinrich Himmler. On his behalf acted as well Reinhard Heydrich, equally responsible for both the evacuation of the Poles and Jews and settlement of the ethnic Germans. The resettlement of the Germans was always linked to economic rationalization. For one German family, often two or three, sometimes up to five members of dependent minority races ("Fremdvölkische") - so the Nazi term - families had to be displaced or repatriated. Based on various reference figures and "target profiles", the regional planners calculated the optimum "population structure". Depending on the quality of land and soil, they laid down the number of persons per square kilometre who were to be employed in agriculture. This in turn allowed them to calculate the optimum number of "non-agricultural workers". Similar calculations were made for the individual occupational groups. Then usually several – according to the requirements - Polish farms and craftsmen businesses were combined so as to assign them subsequently to a German farmer or craftsman. Thus the German bakers, shoemakers or farmer were to be endowed with - as it was said -"healthy" enterprises. As a result the number of forced repatriates was always markedly higher than the one of the newly settled Germans.

Within the course of these settling measures not only Polish and Jewish people were selected and classified, but the ethnic Germans as well. They were divided into various categories depending on their home communities abroad, their social structure, their property status, their "political complexion" and their state of health, and were redistributed accordingly. The criteria to effect such categorizations were to be established on scientific grounds. In the summer of 1942 Herbert Backe, undersecretary in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, recommended the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (KWS) to set up an institute for matters of race biology and settlement. At that time Backe himself was vice president of the KWS, an institution for the Advancement of Science with a likewise high international standing. Due to his influential position in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Backe was the key figure for the financing of all the Society's institutes dedicated to agricultural research in the widest sense. In the new Institute future settlers for the "Eastern territories" were to be chosen according to race biological aspects. "A particularly important question would be", it states in the relevant memo, " if one were to set the individual tribes in certain regions in closed or mixed settlements. Everything would depend upon the settlers biological aptitude for certain climate and soil conditions." So far neither the Ministry of Food and Agriculture nor the Reichsführer SS disposed of scientific material concerning these issues, which now should be established in the hence to be founded institute, it said. <sup>7</sup>

In the summer of 1942 scientific occupation with settlement in the East was by no means only just beginning. Equally professionals of a variety of disciplines were participating in the selection of settlers for the occupied Eastern territories – however not in accordance with the criterion demanded by Backe. Come to that, his – not to be realised - proposal is an example for how the new tasks confronting Nazi politics in the captured East, led to an increasing differentiation of the scientific statement of problems.

#### The Role of Science

The settlement policy linked sociological with biological models of a social rearrangement. As made particularly plain in this example, Nazi politics based to a high degree upon scientific political advice. That not only applied to the social sciences, as shown by the plethora of regional planners, sociologists, population scientists, etc., but as well to the natural sciences and primarily to biology. With the rise of the eugenic paradigm in humanities at the fin du sié cle, biology increasingly claimed interpretational sovereignty on social phenomena. Within the context of this development eugenics, racial and population science experienced an enormous increase of meaning. "The style of eugenic-scientific thought fell in line in answer to a crisis or predicament widely perceived at that time among the bourgeoisie, that is the presumption of a general social and cultural decline owing to the effects of the "social issue" – marked by an established increase of poverty, delinquency, asociality, dissemination, prostitution and alcoholism. A predicament, which (...) on the other hand had also been fortified by the eugenic scientific approach – that is its specific interpretation and rearrangement of reality – and in part really brought about at all.<sup>8)</sup> Eugenics' ascend to a key science supported the perception of these social phenomena as being genetic, which in return made the investigation of the genetic base of all kinds of "peculiarities" appear all the more urgent.

Eugenic research was adjusted to the utopia of a "deviance-free" society. This required the scientific definition and precise registration of all hereditary factors defined as "sick" or "inferior" with the end to be able to exclude them from reproduction. "The biological collective of the national body (Volkskörper) was the highest normative authority in the eugenic way of

thinking, where the value of the individual was compared with the destination of his individual hereditary factors. That induced the claim of the genetic inequality of all people." <sup>9)</sup>

The boom of eugenics and racial hygiene was neither a specific National Socialist nor exclusively German phenomenon. Similar developments could be registered in other countries as well. Specific to the development in National Socialism however, is the close relation between science and practice and the rapid transformation of scientific recommendations in the fields of eugenics and racial science into political decisions. As well scientists of the already mentioned KWS placed their expertise at the service of the National Socialist racial policy and acted as political advisers on the numerous newly founded boards and committees. Leading scientists of the KWI for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics provided contributions for exploring the "Jewish question" or conferred on professional meetings on the "comprehensive solution of the Jewish question." Several of their colleagues prepared racial or parentage testimonies, providing the basis to classify people as "full-", "half-" or "quarterly-" Jewish persons and to discriminate them progressively. Others performed a "racial biological investigation of the Eastern nations." <sup>10</sup> Almost all disciplines participated in the submission and long-term transformation of occupied Eastern Europe.

Scientists provided the data concerning population ratio, socio-economic situation, food provisions and raw material resources in the countries, which were already occupied or to be conquered soon. Statisticians registered Jews and Gypsies separately in censuses – or used three different testimonies to calculate the possibility to deport the European Jews as a whole to Madagascar. <sup>11</sup>) Economists determined the delivery quota und thus the hunger of the population in the occupied territories. <sup>12</sup>) Nutrition physiologist regarded the Leningrad blockade as an experiment to find out, how long it would take to starve the population of a big city. <sup>13</sup>) Social scientists developed proposals for the "*Bereinigung der Volkstumsgrenzen*" (adjustment of the ethnic limits) or "de-Judaization of small market towns." <sup>14</sup>) Physicians recognized the ghettos as dangerous sources of epidemics and demanded to cut them off rigidly or even better, to dissolve them by means of deportation.

Usually the scientific experts in question, participating as political advisers in the definition of national socialist control plans belonged to a very young intellectual elite. After experiencing the "Versailles Disgrace" and the threat of unemployment during the world depression they owed unexpected opportunities for promotion to the Nazi state: for many academics the expulsion of Jewish and socialist scientists since 1933, the expansion of national functions (into fields like regional order/Raumordnung, hereditary hygiene, military technology and substitute material production) and finally the territorial expansion since 1938 meant new professional challenges. The war opened new scope of duties to them and freed science from its ethical boundaries. <sup>15</sup> The German academic elite regarded justice and ethics as categories alien to science, which they perceived as obstructive and felt that could ignored under the new political conditions.

The conviction, prevailing especially in the occupied Eastern countries, that there was no need to show consideration neither for the people living there nor the organic structures fortified the atmosphere of departure and the planning of things for the sake of planning. "In the East," as a German economist working in occupied Poland phrased it, "the economic planner is confronted by a totally new set of circumstances. It is not a matter of where to site an individual industrial plant of how to develop the best transport infrastructure for a country when other economic factors are known quantity. In economic terms what one has here is pretty much a tabula rasa situation." <sup>16</sup>

The scientists placed their qualifications at the service of the national socialist system, be it for political convictions, for career interests or for devotion to science. But the relationship between science and Nazi rule was a mutual one. Hence the talk about the "misuse of science" or its mobilization for a criminal policy is misleading. In their cooperation with the National Socialism scientists recompensed own projects and were rewarded for their commitment. They were given extremely favourable research conditions and the possibility to continue their professional career even during the war and, last but not least, material compensations. That not only applies to the politics-close social scientists but as well to natural scientists, who according to their self-image were especially bound to scientific objectivity.

After German troops invaded the Soviet Union, German scientists grasped the opportunity to visit the famous Soviet institutes and take over many of them. Such explorations were particularly attractive for scientists of those disciplines, where soviet researchers occupied leading positions, like for instance in the field of plant breeding. Above all German botanists and biologists were in a rush to visit the world-famous Soviet plant breeding stations, because valuable resources otherwise could be destroyed during the war but also because official Soviet science under Stalin disproved the allegedly "bourgeois" genetics and therefore perhaps might destroy or at least abandon the genetic institutes. For German scientists this was a unique opportunity to take over the world leading position of Soviet genetics by usurpation of the Soviet scientific resources. An outspoken run to the Soviet institutes started among German scientists who competed each other in getting access to the famous plant collections of their Soviet colleagues.

There was a special institution, the "Zentrale für Ostforschung" (Central Office for Eastern Research), which coordinated the seizure of the Soviet research institutes and organized research in the occupied territories and got hold of Russian scientists willing to collaborate with the German occupiers. The "Zentrale" which was subordinated to the Reich ministry of Occupied Eastern territories employed several scientists from Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institutes, who thus advanced from a subordinate position as head of a department in a German institute to the rank of a science manager in the occupied Eastern territories. The "Zentrale" also organized the removal of scientific collections and research equipment when the Wehrmacht had to retreat from the East. According to the notorious "scorched earth" policy the Germans destroyed everything they could not carry away – well aware that in the case of seed collections this would mean starvation to the remaining population.

In his study on the extermination of the European Jews Raul Hilberg wrote that the efficiency of the extermination process was fortified by a climate, which promoted self-starting qualities on all levels. <sup>17</sup> Not only in regard to the bureaucracy Hilberg refers to, but also to science. Career chances in the occupied territories and research material from ransacked science institutions built the material basis for the committed participation in the policy of conquest and established an interest coalition between the political leadership and the scientific community. This kind of loyalty-causing benefiting though especially pronounced in science, was however in no way confined to it. The widespread idea across all strata of the German population consisted of Germany being a poor country, robbed of all its colonies, with an insufficient resource basis for its numerous population – thus justifying the war in the East with need to provide food and raw materials. <sup>18)</sup> Apart from that a broad anti-Semitic consensus existed in the German population that not only labelled "Eastern Jews" to "Untermenschen," sub-humans, but facilitated the exclusion of Jews from society within a couple of years following the National Socialist seizure of power

In this talk I can't go into detail regarding the individual steps leading from initial hesitation and scepticism of the non-Jewish Germans towards the national socialist anti-Jewish policy to their participation if not even enthusiastic consent.

## Germans and Jewish Property

In this context I am most of all interested in the part the confiscated Jewish property played here. Similar to the usurped research resources in the case of scientists, in the case of the German majority society the possessions of the Jews served the purpose of instigating consensus and loyalty for the Nazi policy. On very different levels non-Jewish Germans gained from robbing the Jews.

They bought furniture, jewellery and other valuables from Jewish emigrants far below their market value, and took favourably possession of attractive flats - after Jews had been forced by law to live together in extremely cramped conditions in special "Jew-houses" – and they bought shops and craftsmen businesses at ridiculously low prices. The private benefiting was one variety of the "redistribution" that secured the consent of a vast majority for the Nazi government. In this way Nazi state could satisfy the expectations of the "little people" - without having expenses. In addition to the private Jewish municipal property as well changed its owner, Jewish hospitals were turned into military hospitals, old people's homes appointed for the accommodation of "Aryan" children and thus the social security benefits for non-Jews were maintained on a much higher level than otherwise possible during the war.

"Aim of the public sales (of Jewish property) was to 'spread the goods at reasonable prices involving as many people as possible among the population." <sup>19</sup> From Hamburg's - particularly well documented - "Aryanisation" benefited above all former employees and junior merchants, planning to become self-employed, and branch newcomers, driven by the prospect of lucrative deals as well as members and officials of the NSDAP.

Other countries as well used the Jewish property with the purpose of gaining public consent for the deportation of the Jews through personal benefits. This is especially true for real estate. Whereas cultural assets and mobile valuables could as easily be transported to Germany, estates and houses remained in the country and were usually offered at bargain prices to the native, non-Jewish population.<sup>20</sup>

Christian Gerlach has worked out the analogy in the confiscation of the property of the Armenians and the Hungarian Jews. He states: "In both cases predatory thinking added essentially to the readiness to violence. In both cases the state tried to get hold of the robbed property as intact as possible and to redistribute it in order to compensate the burdens of war for the population. However, the two administrations were completely different in their means

and measure in the design of politics. In the case of Hungary during WWII (as well as other European countries either occupied or allied with Germany) the confiscation of Jewish property served several purposes: First, it could soften the lack of consumer goods owing to war, diminish black market activities and discontent; second, the sale absorbed the surplus spending power and third, the proceeds went immediately into the national budget and helped to stabilize it. In Hungary even the distribution of clothing, shoes, household effects from Jewish possessions were often organised by the state; valuables and real estate could almost completely be monopolized by the national budget and were in part used for social measures with the purpose of fortifying the war readiness. In 1915, however, the personal articles from Armenian property were mainly looted by the local population; valuables were many times privately pocketed and real estate was – quite similar to the German settlement policy in the annexed Polish territories – used for the otherwise impossible financing of the settlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees.<sup>21</sup>

The calculated use of Jewish property in the sense of the outlined "redistribution" fits into the picture of National Socialism as a kind of rule of instrumental behaviour freed from moral constraints (Peukert). The Jewish property, given to interested or needy Germans at bargain prices, served the purpose of prompting consensus in German society in the same way as the captured material from the occupied territories. In the case of the scientific elites it was not so much the material advantage than rather the expanded research and planning horizon that founded the cooperation with the state power. And the fact, that they and their expertise were in demand, the way from a bold plan to its practical realisation apparently short. (Regarding the utopias of a rearranged Europe the murderous part was realised, not so, however, the fantasies concerning an unlimited rule of the German master race on the whole continent. And finally the system remained trapped in the self-made contradictions.) Just as important this instrumental, harsh and amoral pragmatism may be for the explanation of the perpetrators' society, as little can it "explain" the Holocaust. The rift remains, that yawns between the utilitarian calculation of the perpetrators and the victims' experience of incalculability and impotence. Unlike the idea, that the Holocaust was a more or less archaic crime of violence, beyond human civilisation. It's one of its possibilities.

#### Notes

- 1) Omer Bartov, 'Widerschein der Zerstörung: Krieg, Genozid und moderne Identität', Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung 1 (1999) 1, 46-69; here 67. Compare David Rousset, l'univers concentrationnaire (Paris: Hachette, 1995).
- **2)** Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies. The ruin of memory (New Haven u. a.: Yale University Pr., 1991).
- **3)** Frank Chalk & Kurt Jonassohn, The history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case studies (New Haven u. a.: Yale University Pr., 1990), 323.

<sup>4)</sup> Ibid., 324.

Mihran Dabag & Kristin Platt (eds.), Genozid und Moderne, Bd. 2, Erinnern, Verarbeiten, Weitergeben (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag f
ür Sozialwissenschaften, 2000), 16.

**<sup>6)</sup>** Aron Rodrigue, 'The Mass Destruction of Armenians and Jews in the 20th Century in Historical Perspective', in Hans-Lukas Kieser & Dominik J. Schaller (eds.), Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoa. The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah (Zürich: Chronos, 2002) 303-316, here 313.

<sup>7)</sup> Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Berlin (MPG-Archiv), Abt. I, Rep. 1A (Generalverwaltung der KWG), 971, Aktennotiz Telschow, 29 July 1942.

8) Doris Kaufmann, 'Eugenische Utopie und wissenschaftliche Praxis im Nationalsozialismus', in Wolfgang Hardtwig (ed.), Utopie und politische Herrschaft im Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit (Kolloquium zum Thema "Utopie und politische Herrschaft im Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit" vom 2. bis zum 5. Mai 2001 im Historischen Kolleg) (München: Oldenbourg, 2003), 309-325, here: 311.

- 10) Compare Hans-Walter Schmuhl, 'Rasse, Rassenforschung, Rassenpolitik. Annäherungen an das Thema', in Hans-Walter Schmuhl (ed.), Rassenforschung an Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten vor und nach 1933 (Workshop Rassenforschung im Nationalsozialismus: Konzepte und wissenschaftliche Praxis unter dem Dach der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft) (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 7-37.
- 11) See Götz Aly & Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung. Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1991), 263f.; Magnus Brechtken, "Madagaskar für die Juden". Antisemitische Idee und politische Praxis 1885-1945, (=Studien zur Zeitgeschichte Bd. 53) (München: Oldenbourg, 1997), 254f..
- 12) Compare Aly, Heim, op. cit., note 11, 366f..
- **13)** Compare Ales Adamowitsch, Daniil Granin, Das Blockadebuch, 1. Teil (Berlin: Verl. Volk und Welt, 1987), 49f.
- 14) Werner Conze, 'Die ländliche Überbevölkerung in Polen', in: Arbeiten des XIV. Internationalen Soziologen-Kongresses, Bucuresti, Mitteilungen, Abteilung B Das Dorf, I. Bd. (=D. Gusti (ed.), Schriften zur Soziologie, Ethik und Politik. Studien und Forschungen 5), (Bukarest: Internat. Soziol. Inst., 1940), 40.
- **15)** This doesn't refer only to the scientific experiments on victims of the "Euthanasia", inmates of concentration camps inmates and prisoners of war but also to forced labourers employed in research institutes and the looting of scientific resouces in occupied countries.
- **16)** Helmut Meinhold, 'Rezension von August Lösch: Die räumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft (Jena 1940)', in Die Burg 3, Heft 3, (1942), 360.
- 17) Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden, Bd. 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 1997), 1071.
- **18)** Saul K. Padover, Lügendetektor. Vernehmungen im besiegten Deutschland 1944/45 (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1999), 67, 75, 119, 124f., 209.
- **19)** Frank Bajohr, "Arisierung" in Hamburg: die Verdrängung der jüdischen Unternehmer; 1933-1945 (Hamburg: Christians, 1997), 332.
- **20)** Compare Gerard Aalders, Geraubt! Die Enteignung jüdischen Besitzes im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Köln: Dittrich, 2000).
- 21) Christian Gerlach, 'Nationsbildung im Krieg: Wirtschaftliche Faktoren bei der Vernichtung der Armenier und beim Mord an den ungarischen Juden', in Hans-Lukas Kieser & Dominik Schaller (eds.), Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah (Zürich: Chronos, 2002), 347-422, here 396.

<sup>9)</sup> Ibid., 312.